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  Abstract 
This paper will first present the purpose and goals of applying functional modelling approach to 
consequence analysis by adopting Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM). MFM Models describe a 
complex system in multiple abstraction levels in both means-end dimension and whole-part 
dimension. It contains causal relations between functions and goals. A rule base system can be 
developed to trace the causal relations and perform consequence propagations. This paper will 
illustrate how to use MFM for consequence reasoning by using rule base technology and describe 
the challenges for integrating functional consequence analysis to practical or online applications in 
supervision systems. It will also suggest a multiagent solution as the integration architecture for 
developing tools to facilitate the utilization results of functional consequence analysis. Finally a 
prototype of the multiagent reasoning system will be introduced. 
1. Introduction 
Prognostics are essential to industry for evaluation of system conditions during operation. It 
focuses on predicting future events when, for example, an anomaly happens in the system and it 
will no longer perform its intended function. In the context of supervision and operation support of 
engineering systems, consequence analysis could be essential both to estimate the potential 
threats and also for evaluating actions that are performed upon the system. The result of 
consequence analysis must be meaningful and reliable to make sense to the operators. The 
information provided need to include actionable suggestions for the operator. With nuclear power 
plants, complex automation systems are adopted, and quantitative dynamic models are explored to 
describe system behaviour. However, to make sense of the vast data that generated by the 
quantitative methods, analysis the functional task. Analyse the consequence propagation on the 
goal-function level is therefore a useful approach to help the operator interpret the system 
performance. An on-line consequence analysis tool based on functional models of the plant can 
facilitate the operation supervision system and risk monitoring, and provides meaningful prediction 
of the system behaviour. 
The goal of this paper is to present the purpose and method of applying functional modelling 
approach to consequence analysis in supervision systems by using Multilevel Flow Modelling 
(MFM). This paper also explains how rule-based software tools can be developed to trace the 
causality in goal-function relations represent in functional models of the system and perform 
consequence propagation. It also illustrates how to use MFM for consequence reasoning by using 
rule-based system technology and describe the challenges in integrating functional consequence 
analysis into online applications in supervision systems. This paper also serves as a guideline for 
the first author’s PhD project founded by Technical University of Denmark and Institute for Energy 
Technology, Halden, Norway. 
The paper is organized as follows. The purposes of applying functional modelling in prognostic 
problems are introduced in Section 2. The featured modelling methodology MFM is briefly 
introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, general principles for developing rule-based system for 
consequence analysis by using MFM are demonstrated. In Section 5, several challenges are 
   
 
addressed concerning how to integrate the analytic tool in a real-time application and a multiagent 
solution is suggested as the integration architecture. The paper is concluded in the last Section. 
2. Why to Use Functional Modelling 
2.1 The scope of consequence in the paper 
When talking about consequences in the safety and reliability engineering, the term often refers to 
the result of a realized hazard or critical event [1]. However consequence is also a relative term 
between two events that has causal relation in between. The realization of a critical event often 
trace back to anomalies in the system during operation as it causes, that means critical events 
shall be considered consequences to failures of system components. The consequence 
propagation that is discussed in this paper starts with one or multiple function anomalies during the 
system operation and ends at critical events such as system breakdown (goal failure). This is 
corresponding to the boundary of the system that functional model captures. The grey block in 
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Figure 1. The scope of consequence analysis in the paper 
This scope should be clarified so that the readers shouldn’t confuse the topic in this paper with 
methods that used in the other part of consequence propagation, such as consequence modelling. 
2.2 Functional modelling approach 
System level analysis for an engineering system is becoming more essential as the level of 
complexity of the system grows. The correlation and interaction between system components has 
to be studied in order to design and operate a complex system. However, traditional analysis and 
methods for plant design and operation focus on structure layer’s study rather than functional layer, 
which do not facilitate system level analysis. Traditional modelling approach representing complex 
system like nuclear power plant have problem to capture the causality between system functions 
and its operational goals. The study of cause-effect in the system is often based on temporal data 
and experiential knowledge with traditional methods. Functional modelling is a formalized method 
to represent purposes and cause-effect in a complex system. The means-end concept encrypted 
with functional modelling suggest that it can also indicate the temporal order of events propagation, 
because as commonly understood, means must be realized prior to the ends. A functional 
representation of the plant is a very good supplement to perceive goal function causality and 
therefore, provide means to analyse failures and evaluate plant conditions.  
Functional modelling comprises concepts, methods and tools for representing the purposes and 
functional organization of complex dynamic systems. [2] Concepts of functional modelling are 
relevant to system design and operation because they provide systematic ways to common sense 
knowledge of the system, which is often hidden behind other model representations and much 
   
 
relies on individual operator’s understanding of the operation purposes. Functional models have 
the capability to capture different perspectives and abstraction levels based on operation purposes.  
The adoption of functional approaches to system design in industry has been slow despite its close 
relevancy. It is much due to the reason that there’s lack of conceptual and methodological 
foundations. With the recent development within the field, some methodology such as Multilevel 
Flow Modelling (MFM) has been becoming mature. Besides modelling NPP by using MFM [3-6], 
several application oriented research based on MFM has been conducted including alarm design 
and risk monitoring. [7-12] 
2.3 Consequence analysis in supervision systems 
Supervision system performs online condition monitoring (OLM) of plant equipment, systems and 
processes include the detection and diagnosis of abnormalities in operation. [13] Many studies [14-
16] have been devoted to sensor development and sensor data processing. However, synthesis 
and abstracting meaningful information from sensor data requires support of other technology. 
Since the 1990s, OLM techniques have been explored by the nuclear industry for equipment 
condition monitoring beyond sensors. [13] And besides the diagnostic indicators, prognostic 
indicators are also used to assess the plant condition. Qualitative models are considered and 
Human Machine Interface (HMI) becomes a major topic. A qualitative method such as fault tree 
analysis is adopted for diagnostic and prognostic purposes while the event trees are for 
prognostics in the nuclear industry. However these methods suffer from draw backs such as time 
consuming and very high requirement of operation knowledge. A systematic method need to be 
introduced to support the evaluation of operation condition based on the vast quantity of sensor 
data available.  
Therefore, functional level of consequence analysis should be part of the tool repository for system 
evaluation and operation support. Report [13] suggests that MFM can be used with specially 
developed algorithms for a number of supervision tasks. With this modelling technique, both root 
cause analysis and consequence analysis can be performed due to the means-end concept of 
MFM. The MFM methodology is emphasize in the next section. 
3. MFM and Reasoning in MFM 
3.1 The MFM principles 
Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM) is a modelling method representing an industrial plant as a system 
which provides the means required to serve purposes in its environment. [17] MFMs incorporate 
goals and objectives of the system, functions and structures that describe the physical 
components, and relations between functions and structures. It also adopts a predefined graphical 
modelling language, with symbolic representation for objectives, functions and relations. A list of 
the common symbols for MFM objectives and functions/relations with an example of complete 
MFM model are showed in Figure 2. Notice that flow structures are represented by individual round 
corner rectangular in the model, which is not listed in the table as a symbol. They can be either an 
energy flow, mass flow, or control structure. The whole model example in the Figure 2 is an 
extended MFM model of watermill [17], which is a commonly used example for beginners of the 
MFM modelling. [18-20] provides more background for understanding MFM concepts. 
   
 
     
 
Figure 2. MFM Symbols and Model Example 
3.2 MFM Reasoning 
As exemplified in Figure 2, MFM constructs the model by using building blocks that correspond to 
functions and goals. It describes energy and mass flows in a physical system with different level of 
decomposition, and the representation is in an abstracted way which is independent of individual 
components that compose the physical system. MFM modelling is not only a way of representation, 
but also a convenient tool to analyse and reason about the system performance. Reasoning in 
MFM models is based on dependency relations between states of objectives and functions. The 
possible states of each MFM entity are listed in Table 1. 
 
Function Possible States 
Source: normal, abnormal 
Sink: normal, abnormal 
Transport: no flow, low flow, normal, high flow 
Storage: high volume, normal, high volume  
Barrier: leak, normal 
Balance: leak, normal, fill 
Objective: fulfilled, failed  
Table 1. Possible state for MFM entities 
The dependency relations defined in MFM are independent of the particular modelling object, and 
only based on predefined patterns [21]. The patterns are created by different combinations of MFM 
entities, states and the influence relations or means-end relations in between them. They are 
defined as cause-effect relations. Root cause reasoning and consequences reasoning for MFM are 
explained in [21]. The basic idea of consequence propagation is that an abnormal state of one 
function or objective influences another function or objective’s state in a MFM model along the 
MFM relations so that an effect path can be generated by continuing inferences until the path end 
at a defined critical failure in operation purposes. Note that MFM reasoning is based on patterns 
   
 
matching and proposition propagation. Therefore a rule-based system can be developed for MFM 
reasoning. 
4. Rule-based System for Consequence Analysis 
In computer science, rule-based systems are used as a way to store and manipulate knowledge to 
interpret information in a useful way. A typical rule based system has four basic components: 
 A user interface or other connection to the outside world through which the knowledge of the 
system is collected and the input and output signal can be sent. 
 A knowledge base that stores the system information and conditions. 
 A rule base contains a set of rules, which is a specific type of knowledge base. 
 An inference engine or semantic reasoner, which infers information or takes action based on 
the interaction of knowledge base and the rule base. 
The overall architecture of MFM reasoning is illustrated in Figure 3. The reasoning system 
described here is used for consequence analysis. Similar tools can be developed by change the 
database and reasoning rules. 
 
 
Figure 3. Reasoning System Architecture 
 
As a FM model reasoning tool, the knowledge base of the system is separated into sub-databases, 
which can be classified as static databases and dynamic databases. The static represent all the 
plant knowledge that scripted into the plant model. The dynamic database stores event based 
knowledge sets either the plant condition observation or the deductive results. The rule base is also 
separated into subsets. This rule sets can be considered as executing modules with each used for 
a specific reasoning purposes. A combination of different rule bases can perform on one reasoning 
   
 
task. The reasoning maintenance system (RMS) in Figure 3 is a specialized function set which 
manages the interdependencies of the inferences. This means that when a new proposition is 
suggested by the inference engine, the RMS with its rules will check the truthfulness of the new 
proposition. Only if the new proposition is valid and consistent with the existing database, it can be 
accepted; and otherwise RMS will try to resolve the conflict before make change to the database. 
RMS is drawn in a separated block to emphasize its critical role in the inference engine. It is a 
generic module for rule-based system to maintain the access to the database. Other sub-function 
sets including model generation functions, event generation functions are not specified in the 
figure. An interface can be built to create static databases or give interactive input. 
In general, the architecture described in Figure 3 can be applied to any given FM methodologies 
such as MFM. This architecture can be extended easily by define a new set of knowledge base, 
rule base, and also a new interface if necessary. A new knowledge base can be generated through 
either input interface or existing knowledge bases.  
For MFM, root-cause analysis rule-based software (MFM Workbench) has been developed using 
the same architecture in Figure 3 by Morten Lind and a separate model drawing tool (MFMEditor) 
for MFM is developed by Harald P-J Thunem of IFE Halden.[22] The first version of integration of 
software had been done in December 2012 by using intermediate files for interaction between the 
Reasoner and the Editor. Documentation will be available soon. More sophisticate interaction 
strategy is under exploring.  
5. Integration Challenges 
5.1 Real-time reasoning challenges 
The first challenge for real-time reasoning of consequence propagation in the system is to identify 
and handle the propagation loops. MFM models are constructed based on means-end concept. 
The temporal aspect is represented in MFM models because of its roots in means-end concept. 
Each set of measurements from a certain time frame reflect to a set of states in the functional 
model, and this set of function states will be considered as the cause of the states change in all 
future time. However, the future function state changes may give further influence on the functions 
that was the cause of this state changes. There are three kinds of consequence propagations. 
5.1.1 Loop free propagation 
The change of state in Function A influence the state in Function B and Function B have no further 
influence upon Function A or any of Function A’s upstream functions. This inference can be 
expressed in a simple IF-THEN sentence: 
IF R(A(?),B(?)) and A(X), THEN B(Y). 
R is the relation between function A and B. See Figure.4.  
 




   
 
5.1.2 Acceleration loop 
The state X in Function A will result in state Y in Function B. The state Y in Function B will influence 
Function A or Function A’s upstream functions and result in a more severe level of state X in 
Function A. That is to say both of the following IF-THEN statements are true: 
IF R(A(?),B(?)) and A(X), THEN B(Y). 
IF R(A(?),B(?))and B(Y), THEN A(X). 
The cause and consequence in this kind of loops must be identified through the temporal 
information documented in the database. However the propagation loop is equally important 
because of its exacerbation nature. 
5.1.3 Counteraction loop  
The state X in Function A will result in state Y in Function B. The state Y in Function B will give a 
negative influence to state X of Function A and tend to cancel out the effect of the state deviation in 
Function A. That is to say both of the following IF-THEN statements are true: 
IF R(A(?),B(?)) and A(X), THEN B(Y). 
IF R(A(?),B(?)) and B(Y), THEN not A(X). 
This situation may indicate a self-healing behaviour. However it may also suggest that the system 
is trying to cover up a physical failure and the problem might be temporarily balanced but will result 
in increasing stress of component or even more sever failure.  
The above three propagation patterns should be properly identified by the reasoning tool. The 
challenge is not only a software develop problem but a theoretical problem for functional 
consequence reasoning. Resolve these propagation loops simply as reasoning conflicts may result 
in untruthful evaluation of the system. Note that the propagation loop cannot be complete in the 
same cause-effect time frame, but will only happen when the time proceeds. In the MFM 
Workbench, similar reasoning conflicts have been identified. The reasoning engine can solve 
conflicts in a single time frame (when propagation loop is considered invalid). How the reasoning 
should be continued with change of time frame is still open. 
The second challenge in consequence reasoning for real time applications is to identify the primary 
consequence so that it can help the operator to evaluate the situation and make proactive actions 
to prevent the major failures. As discussed in section 2.1, the consequence propagation should end 
at a possible critical event in system operation. Without severity study and probability associated 
with the possible consequences propagation to identify the critical events, the analysis will be over 
scattered and meaningless for real-time operation.  
Associating extra time prediction to functional models is the third challenge for real-time 
applications. MFM models can indicate the event sequences because it based on means-end 
concept that can indicate the event sequence. But time prediction is also important in a real-time 
environment. One solution is to associate historical data with the consequence propagation so that 
the operator can get a rough prediction of how long time will it take for the failure to propagate to a 
primary consequence (critical event).  
   
 
The plant situation will be updated as the time proceeds. Hypothetical consequences may be 
proved untrue to the system so that the consequence path should be suppressed. Therefore, one 
may want to reason about the consequences according to the completeness of the plant 
information. However this problem is more important for online diagnosis to find the real root 
causes than for prognosis. However, as discussed in section 2.2, functional models also represent 
shift of operation purposes during different plant conditions. Therefore, another challenge in 
consequence analysis is to shift the focus and continue the analysis under plant representation 
changes. 
5.2 Integration challenge 
The consequence analysis can only provide certain information needed for plant operation. How to 
integrate the consequence analysis tool with other online support tool is also a challenging 
problem.  Other tools such as root-cause analysis system are closely related to the consequence 
analysis and the result from the two sorts can be combined for action suggestion, condition 
monitoring or maintenance management. Higher level reasoning procedures may be required for 
further development. Therefore a standard architecture for integration is very important. 
5.3 Multiagent architecture 
To solve the integration problem, multiagent system is proposed to solve the task organization 
problem. A multi-agent system (MAS) is a system composed of multiple interacting intelligent 
agents within an operating environment. Multi-agent systems can be used to solve problems that 
are difficult or impossible for an individual agent or a monolithic system to solve. Supervision 
System is a very complex system that requires multiple independent functionalities sharing 
common knowledge of the plant. By packing each function unit into a software agent can provide a 
standard schema for information exchange and communication.  
The multiagent architecture is also a good facility to solve the reasoning challenges by introducing 
more independent inference engines that can conduct reasoning tasks in parallel with each other. 
So each agent can handle a certain aspect of the reasoning task and focusing on its own 
assignment. The distribution of the reasoning task will introduce new challenge of multiagent 
planning. Reference [23] suggests using blackboard system concept to solve the task organization 
problem. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper explains the purposes of applying functional modelling to consequence analysis that to 
support the plant operation. It introduce a particular functional modelling methodology namely 
Multilevel Flow Modelling and the basic principles for applying MFM to consequence reasoning and 
how rule-based system can be developed to facilitate the reasoning. Challenges that will probably 
be encountered during the theory and tool development have been explained. Multi-agent solution 
has been suggested as integration framework for NPP online supervision system. Provide 
theoretical support and practical solutions for these challenges will be the main subject of the first 
author’s on-going PhD project.   . 
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